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Abstract

According to the macroeconomic identity, combined private sector and public
sector balance should match current account balance in any economy. This senior project
applies the macroeconomic identity to Chinese data, and analyzes systematically China’s
economic structure. The analysis finds that China is not as reliant on trade as people
normally think despite that the private sector is running a large surplus. Furthermore, it
also shows that the private sector can be induced to spend more, and the public sector has
much potential to increase deficit spending. Based on these results, I recommend a
combination of 10% to 20% exchange rate appreciation, financial liberalization,
equalizing tax between trade and non-trade departments, and increasing public spending.
The projected outcome of such policy package is that trade surplus and private sector
surplus will both decrease, and correspondingly public sector deficit will increase. Such
outcome can help China to reduce trade imbalance and ease overheating in terms of
overinvestment, thus creating a more sustainable growth pattern that is hinged on
domestic consumption.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview

As the world is slowly and painfully edging out of financial crisis, one thing has
become clear: consumers in the West, particularly the US will no longer be the engine for
future global growth. Instead, emerging economies have to consume more. This brings
our focus onto China, the second largest economy with the world’s largest population.
Both the international community and the Chinese government have realized the need for
China to rebalance towards greater reliance on consumption. While there is little
objection that the Chinese government has successfully executed a miraculous growth
story on an unprecedented scale, it is much less clear how proficient the regime will be in
unleashing internal growth potential.
China’s past performance is generally known to fall back on state-led investment
in domestic infrastructure and exports. After decades of heavy investment, the effect of
diminishing return has rendered infrastructure spending ever less efficient. When it rains,
it pours. The untimely outbreak of global financial crisis and the subsequent deleveraging
of western consumers shut the other engine of growth. Over-optimistic voices and words
of demise about China’s future have always existed, but only become more abound now.
This reflects the underlying uncertainty China has not faced in at least more than a
decade. Standing at the end of the comfortable path where appetite of western consumers
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readily absorbs surplus Chinese labor, China now has to find a new path of growth
centering on domestic consumption.
Although calls for rebalancing are widely heard from the media and the academia,
many questions about China’s rebalancing efforts remain unanswered. The most
important ones are: how feasible and to what extent could the middle-lower income
Chinese citizens stand up to support the country’s economic miracle? What is the
appropriate level of investment? How quickly does rebalance have to be made? While it
is not possible to provide exact answers to all the three questions, my senior project aim
to contribute to the literature in two ways. Firstly, I will apply the macroeconomic
identity analysis, which has mostly been used on the US economy, to Chinese data.
Secondly, I will draw on various studies concerning individual sectors, and piece together
a fuller picture that shows the overall state of the Chinese economy. Together, I hope the
results will shed some lights on important policy choices for China to maintain its growth.
In the project, considerable effort will be spent on the seemingly simple task of
understanding the numbers. In developing countries like China where both the structure
of the economy and the reporting methods are rapidly changing, it is always wise to look
behind the surface. Many headline numbers we may have seen are misleading. As such, I
will pay special attention to explain why the familiar headlines are biased. When data is
available, I try to trace the path all the way back to the establishment of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Otherwise I will focus on the period since 1978 when
economic reform started.
The entire project is divided into six chapters. The remaining of this chapter will
give an account of China’s past GDP growth path focusing on its sustainability and
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introduce the macroeconomic identity. In the next four chapters, I will consecutively
discuss the public sector, the external sector, the business portion of the private sector and
the household portion of the private sector. The central questions concerning the
respective sectors are: China’s fiscal policy stance; China’s true reliance on trade;
possibilities of overinvestment; and the causes behind the striking fall in household
consumption as a share of GDP. In the final chapter, I will use results from studies
discussed in the preceding chapters to construct three different scenarios and provide
policy packages required to achieve the projected growth. It should be noted that the
scenarios presented are conditional projections that are different from forecasts. They are
meant to show the likely outcomes if the various results to which this senior project is
based on turn out to be true.

1.1 The China Story

Figure 1: Haver analytics
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Starting from the macro data, China’s real GDP growth rate has averaged 10.1%
for the three decades following economic reform in 1978. Although the number is
impressive, it tells us little about what happened. Thus, the first step is to break up the
gross figure into different components. By convention of expenditure accounting, GDP
growth comes from domestic consumption, investment and net exports. Two figures are
plotted: Figure 1 shows the overall real GDP growth rates as well as contribution of each
component to growth on a yearly basis; and Figure 2 shows the cumulative weight of
each component in the year’s GDP.

Figure 2: Haver analytics

In Figure 1, the top line shows the real GDP growth rate. In each given year, the
three lower lines will add up to give the real GDP growth rate. The figure tells us where
the growth comes from, but does not show the absolute weight. For instance, the
contribution of net exports to growth in 2008 is about zero. This does not mean that net
exports did not contribute anything to GDP in 2008, but it shows that net exports in 2008
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is about the same amount as 2007, hence there is no growth coming from net exports. For
absolute weight in GDP, we need to refer to Figure 2. It should be noted that absolute
weight is different from absolute value. The cumulative weight will decrease if the
component is not growing at least as fast as the real GDP growth, which is about 10% a
year. On the other hand, if a component is growing at a speed quicker than 10% a year,
its weight in real GDP will

increase.

We can see from Figure 2 that private consumption was the most important
component of GDP in the earlier years of reform, and from Figure 1 that domestic
consumption contributed about two-third of growth. Domestic consumption is made up of
private and public consumption. Public consumption has fluctuated within the narrow
range of 13% to 16%, varying slightly from year to year s stable as a share of GDP. Thus
changes in domestic consumption are mainly due to private consumption changes. As we
may observe from Figure 1, the importance of domestic consumption as a growth
contributor had decreased since the early years of reform, especially after entering the
1990s. This is also reflected in the dramatic fall of private consumption as a share of
GDP. As we can see, after increasing briefly from 48% in 1978 to 55% in 1982, private
consumption started the prolong
ed decline all the way to 35% in 2009. As of 2009, total domestic consumption
accounted just about half of overall GDP.
Correspondingly, investment took the leading role as the growth driver. In the
past ten years, the ratio between investment growth and GDP growth increased steadily
from 23.7% in 1990 to more than 40% in mid-2000s and to 95.6% in 2009! Moreover, it
is worth noting that the peak of investment growth and the trough of exports growth have
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coincided in the past, indicating a conscious effort from the part of investment to
maintain GDP growth when exports slipped. Accumulated investment on average makes
up about 40% of GDP, and peaked to almost 50% on the last count in 2009.
Based on such breakdown, external sector seems to play an amazingly small role
in China’s growth story, contributing negatively rather than positively for most of the
years. For instance, net export pulled down GDP growth in 1983-1985, 1992-1993 and
again in 2009. Cumulatively, net export as GDP share was not significant until 2005,
when it began a hike to the peak of 8.8% GDP in 2007. This sharply contradicts our
impression of China as an export-led economy because the contribution of net export is
both limited and recent. What are more familiar to us may be analysts that use the growth
of total exports as a share of GDP growth. Such measure indicates that export growth has
contributed on average to almost 40% of the total growth in real GDP since 1990, rising
to nearly 60% since 2000.1 On a cumulative scale, exports also account for 20% of GDP
on average since data became available in 1982, and rising to 30% in the mid of 2000s.2
We should note that both approaches mentioned above are biased. The size of
exports represents the additional boost a country receives from the rest of the world, and
imports vice versa. Hence, the net exports value is a clear underestimation of the impact
of external sector because directional impact can be crucial for a country although the
country may receive no net boost from the rest of the world. Take the example of a
country producing only oil and import everything else. The economy will be doomed if
foreign demand for oil decreases even though the net trading position is balanced. On the
other hand, using pure exports value is an overestimation of China’s reliance on external
1

John Horn, Vivien Singer, and Jonathan Woetzel, September 2010 , "A truer picture of China’s export machine,"
McKinsey Quarterly
2
The World Bank country database
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sector because the presence of processing trade. In another word, China imports certain
intermediate products to assemble into final products for exports. While official trade
statistics count the entire value of the final product as exports, China’s role in the process
actually only involves the value of assembling.
We will show in chapter three that China’s exports contain about 50% domestic
valued added, making exports contribution to be 15% of GDP. Although this number is
significantly lower than we may think, it is still very high for an economy the size of
China today when compared internationally. To recap, residential consumption, public
consumption, investment and export have contributed 40.9%, 14.5%, 40.8% and 15.0%
of the GDP respectively on average for the past ten years. As the average net export is
4.4%, it means China’s import will count 10.6% of GDP in order to balance up.
Given this macro picture, it is not immediately clear that there is an urgent need
for China to rebalance towards domestic consumption. In order to show the need, I wish
to refer to the paper by Guo and N'Diaye (2009). In the study, Guo and N'Diaye try to
simulate a growth path where future growth comes mostly from exports. Using the World
Economic Outlook (WEO) projection and past experience of Korea, they project an
8.25% GDP growth rate for China between 2009 and 2020, and 5% thereafter. The study
assumes that China's domestic consumption grows in line with GDP growth and
investment is made to maintain total-factor productivity (TFP) growth at past ten-year
average. Under such assumptions, real exports will have to grow at 14.5% during 2011 to
2020 if import elasticity stays at 2001 to 2009 average. This result implies that current
account balance will be responsible for 15% of GDP, and China has to take up 20% of
world exports by 2040 based on WEO projection for world trade, more than doubling
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China’s current share. The paper goes further to make assumptions about price elasticity
of key industries, identified to be steel, shipbuilding and machinery for China. If these
key industries are responsible for the bulk of exports growth, the world price for steel,
ship and machine tools have to fall by 45%, 12.75%, and 14.5% respectively to
accommodate increased production. Although specific assumptions in the study may be
put to debate, the message is clear: reliance on exports for future growth will lead to
further price distortion, which have to come from thinner profits, implicit and explicit
subsidies, and strained international relations.
If exports expansion is not reliable for sustained grow, it may be questioned
whether further investment increases could do the job. Although levels of investment are
supposed to be natural market reactions, the large share of State Owned Enterprise (SOE)
in the Chinese economy makes it possible for investment to become the last resort growth
driver when other engines like exports and consumptions fall short of expectations. This
is the widely known “Chinese characteristic” policy induced investment. However,
investments as such are not based on profit maximization motives, and their efficiency is
put to doubt. Many studies have been done in this area. For instance, Tang, Zhou and Ma
(2010) find a positive link between degrees of government intervention in SOEs and
levels of overinvestment. As commonly recognized, overinvestment can easily lead to
deteriorating health of the banking industry, which is dominated by the Big Four state
owned banks. As the Big Four are implicitly obliged to finance non-profitable policy
induced investment, China’s banking industry is susceptible to overinvestment. I will
discuss more about investments in chapter four. For now, since China is already
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operating at high level of investment to GDP, it is unlikely that there is much room for
further increase.
It may be argued that a combination of further investment and export growth
could fuel China’s future growth while keeping negative impacts under tolerable levels,
hence the regime does not have to rely on boosting domestic consumption. Although this
can be true, it is to nobody’s benefit that China should continue to distort its structure of
growth. Moreover, we have so far ignored possible retaliation from the international
community. If China is to follow the distortion path, other countries are surely to react
more violently in the future, making the path more difficult to achieve. Therefore,
increasing domestic consumption is the mutually beneficial, and perhaps the only
possibility for China Miracle to be kept alive.

1.2 Macroeconomic Identity
What have been discussed in the previous section may not sound totally
unfamiliar as parts and bits of the discussion may have come across our attention through
media coverage. While it helps to set the stage by explaining why residential
consumption is the key for China’s future, we are much less frequently told to what
extent domestic consumption can be increased in a feasible timeframe so that lose from
exports and possible decrease in investment can be made up for. We know that domestic
consumption is made up of public and residential expenditures. It is certainly true that the
Chinese government has plenty of bullets in terms of buffing up public consumption, and
I will discuss the public sector shortly. However, even for a government having as much
control over the national economy as that of China, it is not possible to force up

9

10

residential consumption. In order to know how much residential consumption could
possibly increase, we must look at the asset stock and the projected income flow of the
private sector as one cannot consume beyond means in a sustainable manner. To do this, I
will introduce the macroeconomic identity analysis.
We can break any economy into three financial balances: the private sector
balance made up of all households and firms, the public sector balance containing all
levels of government, and the current account balance. By the macroeconomic identity of
GDP equals gross national income less net income from abroad, we can derive the
following equation:

(Savings – Private Expenditure) + (Taxes – Government Spending) –
(Payments from Abroad – Payment Made Abroad) = 0

Using common terminology, the above equation can be re-written as:

Private Balance + Public balance – Current Account Balance = 0

A detailed derivation of this equation is included in Appendix 1. As the three
accounts balances always add up to zero, unless each sector is balancing itself, there must
be certain sectors doing deficit spending while the rest is running a surplus. This analysis
reveals important information about financing situations. As good citizens do not go
around robbing banks, any deficit spending must be financed. For instance, government
deficit can be financed with the issuance of new bonds, current account deficit by foreign
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capital inflow, and private deficit by bank loans. Whenever a sector runs a deficit, there
must either be building up of debt or running down of assets, both serving to increase the
financial risk associated with the sector. On the other hand, a sector constantly returning
surpluses has accumulated the power to spend more in the future. In another word, deficit
or surplus in each period is a flow, and the asset is a stock. Current stock can be turned
into future flow, and past flow is accumulated as current stock. In this manner, we can
make estimates about future flows by looking at past flow and current stock. An
application of this method of analysis on the US economy can be found in Godley (1999).

Figure 3: Current account from SAFE; public account from SYB

Figure 3 above shows the three account balances for China. The diagram is
produced using current account and government account information. The private sector
balance is derived from the other two based on the macroeconomic identity. This is
because while current account and fiscal account information is standard, much
complication arises out of the private account. Hence I will proceed to the discussions
and hope they will illuminate a meaningful way to put together the raw private sector
11
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data so that actual values will resemble those theoretically derived ones. As such, I
reserve the calculation of actual private sector data to the final chapter. Each balance in
the figure is divided by GDP to show its relative weight in the rapidly expanding
economy. As the numbers are quoted as deficit, the positive domain in the figure means
the sector is running a deficit while the negative domain means there is a surplus. To start,
I will first discuss the public sector.
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Chapter 2
Public Sector

The raw data on public account is reflected in two ways in China Statistical
Yearbooks (SYB), firstly through the government finance section and secondly in the
flow of fund (fof) data. Through the government finance section, we can glimpse at the
overall fiscal policy by observing total government revenue and expenditure. Through the
fof information, we can know where revenue comes from and where expenditure goes as
well as net changes in asset position. I will start by describing China’s past policy stance.

2.1 Fiscal Policy

Figure 4: PRC 55 Years Statistics Compilation and China SYB 2010
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Using gross revenues minus gross expenditure, the public account balance figure
is constructed as shown in Figure 4. The graph here is the same as the fiscal part of
Figure 3 though a longer time span is involved. In the figure, we can see that fiscal
policies have been very conservative by today’s standard throughout the past 60 years
since the PRC became independence in 1949. Government budgets were about balanced
for most of the time. Even if a deficit did occur, it tended to be only a couple percents of
the GDP. This is in sharp contrast to countries like today’s US where 5% to 10%
government deficits have become the norm. There are both cultural and practical reasons
behind the conservative fiscal policies in China. On the cultural side, unless there are
situations of emergency or unexpectedness, spending beyond one’s means is deemed
inappropriate in the Confucius root. Communist doctrine went even further to denounce
lending behaviors as the root of all evils. Hence, intentional efforts to minimize
government borrowing were evident.
Nevertheless, it is implausible that cultural root was the only impediment behind
more aggressive fiscal policies because there were many occasions during the past 60
years when more active inputs from the part of the government were urgently needed. For
instance, at the very beginning PRC’s independence, the country was lying in ruin after
serving as the battlefield for western invasions, WWII and the civil wars. Just like any
other countries undergoing post-war reconstruction, China was desperately in need of
more proactive government intervention to kick off economic recovery. However, only a
small deficit equivalent to 1.4% GDP was run, and the deficit was covered with the
issuance of discounted “victory bonds” in the same year. Moreover, a string of surplus
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years followed. This is unimaginable for a country that had just gone through more than a
century of war destruction.
The practical difficulty for running a larger fiscal deficit was soon to become
manifest. The period from 1958 to 1961 was the only time when a significant fiscal
deficit was observed throughout the history of the PRC. This is due to the onset of the
Great Leap Forward (GLF) program, when over-ambitious economic goals were set.
Hence government budgets were expanded to facilitate the required inputs. Deficit
spending returned in 1955 and 1956 to about 2%. After a brief dip in 1957, China’s fiscal
deficit started to soar in 1958. Fiscal deficit was 2.0% of GDP in 1958, 3.0% in 1959 and
peaked 6.7% in 1960. Six issuances of “state economic construction bond” during 1954
to 1959 helped to pay for the deficit. Besides, PRC also borrowed heavily from its
communist comrades, mainly from Russia and other Eastern European countries.
However, the result of aggressive government spending was high inflation. Under
the structure of Soviet-style command economy, the private sector was purposely
eliminated or constrained. Hence, domestic demand for government bond was minimal.
In order to finance any deficit, borrowing must be done in the international market. It is
common knowledge that the world was deeply divided by ideological chasm until the fall
of USSR. Hence, China could only borrow from the communist countries since financial
ties with capitalist countries were non-existent. Unfortunately, most communist regimes
were having bitter financial troubles of their own, including the USSR. Hence, any
support China could obtain internationally was very limited. As a result, most deficit
spending was financed by issuing currency. As the centrally planned economy is
characterized by constant supply deficiency, a larger money supply and hence a larger
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claim on limited productions, could easily turn into inflation even if deficit was small at a
couple percents of the GDP.
The entire 1960s and 1970s was a period of immense economic difficulty and
fiscal asceticism in China. As the over-ambitious GLF policies backfired, China’s
economy suffered severe setback, contracting more than 27% in 1961 alone based on
World Bank data. Externally, Sino-Soviet split was made open, leading to Soviet
withdrawal of nearly all technical experts, blueprints and specialists from China. It put a
sudden halt on many major projects, resulting in large resources waste. At the same time,
China was made to repay Soviet debt. This explains why China had to run a fiscal surplus
during the difficult time of early 1960s. When China finally paid off all Soviet debt in
1965, the notorious Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966 and lasted one whole decade
to 1976. The subsequent collapse of production activities led to the collapse of fiscal
revenues. Despite of the hardship, the Chinese government did not issue any internal or
external debt again.
Due to both cultural and practical reasons, deficit spending was not an important
tool to stir economic growth during the entire command economy era. Nonetheless, the
fiscal asceticism enabled China to enter the reform era without debt burden. Since 1981,
the Chinese government abandoned “debt free” policy approach and started to issue
internal debt again. During 1981 to 1990, various debts were issued, but the initial
impulsion of heavy-handed government stimulation was quickly reversed to more benign
deficit of less than 1% GDP. The problem of running large fiscal deficit was again
limited financing options. This problem was only gradually solved when private sector
was revitalized during the 1980s and China began to cultivate ties with the capitalist
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world. In 1993, the central government passed an institutional reform to abolish the
conduct of financing fiscal deficit through direct borrowing from the central bank.
Instead, the treasury was made to issue government bonds while the central bank could
purchase them in the open market. This is similar to the standard practice today.
The timely reform prepared China for the challenge of the Asian Financial Crisis,
which run rampant in 1997, topping the Asian miracles one after another. The Chinese
government reacted to the crisis by expansionary fiscal policies. Fiscal deficit increased
rapidly for six years in a row: 1.1% GDP in 1998, 1.9% in 1999, 2.5% in 2000, 2.3% in
2001, 2.6% in 2002 and 2.2% in 2003. The effect of the reform was clear as the link
between public deficit and inflation was cut. During the post Asian Financial Crisis, retail
price decreased even though public deficit increased. The two marked peaks in inflation
around 1990 were due to market reform rather than deficit spending.
After 2003, government spending kept expanding quickly although deficit level
dropped and turned into a surplus in 2007. This was due to an even quicker pace in
revenues increase. For instance, stamp duty increased almost ten-fold from previous year
due to soaring stock markets and contributed 4.4% of all tax revenue (up from 0.5% in
2006). China’s ability to step up government spending during time of need is again
proven during the global financial crisis. From 2007 to 2009, public expenditure
increased by 23.2%, 25.7% and 21.9% (in nominal terms). The proactive fiscal expansion
through the four trillion RMB stimulus package undeniably helped China’s rapid
recovery from export collapse during the crisis. While the 2010 number is not yet
available, a mild public deficit of about 2% is expected to remain for a while as much of
the stimulus package was spent on long term projects that require follow up investment.
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2.2 Stock and Flow
So far we have only looked at the overall flow figures for China’s public sector.
In order to know whether such flow is sustainable, we also need to look at expenditure
and revenue separately. For this purpose, I will bring in another source, the China SYB
fof data mentioned in the opening of the chapter. In constructing the fof data, the
economy is divided into five sectors, including non-financial firms, financial firms,
household, government and rest of the world. Non-financial firms include all publicly and
privately owned for profits firms engaged in the production of goods and services.
Financial firms include the central bank, commercial banks, insurance companies and
other financial institutional. Governments include all levels of local and central
governments as well as non-for-profit government agencies, such as schools. Households
include all Chinese citizens and the rest of the world is straightforward. The fof table
starts with value added during the production process. For the initial round of income
distribution, firms get profits and fixed asset discount value; households receive labor
income and governments receive value added tax income. Once this is done, property
incomes, which include interests, dividends and rents, are allocated among the sectors.
The above two steps make up for initial distribution round. In the redistribution round,
incomes are transferred among sectors through social welfare or insurance, and income
tax is collected. The income after redistribution is disposable income. A sector can either
save or spend its disposable income. While expenditure is used for consumption, saving
include both real investment and financial investment. The later is the residue of saving
plus transferred income less real investment.
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The two tables below are constructed using the fof data. Table 1 shows income
items and Table 2 shows expenditure items of the government sector for the period
between 1992 and 2008. All numbers are quoted as percentages of GDP. It should be
noted that the “government sector” shown in the tables comes from the combined value
of “governments” and “financial firms” divisions in the fof data. This modification is
made for two reasons. First, China’s financial sector is highly dominated by the state
sector, and much of the financial sector debt is implicitly guaranteed by the Chinese
government. Hence, it is appropriate to treat financial firms as part of the government
sector. Besides, the fof definition of financial firms includes institutions like the central
bank, which is apparently not part of the private sector. Since we cannot ignore financial
firms, it is much more reasonable to attribute them to the public instead of the private
sector.

Table 1: China SYB fof tables (numbers are quoted as percent of GDP)
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Table 2: China SYB fof tables (numbers are quoted as percent of GDP)

The two tables reveal some important messages. First, government income as
percentage of GDP has been increasing, and the increase is most pronounced under tax
and social security, which registered more than 5% jump between early 1990s and late
2000s. It implies that government sector is getting larger in the past ten years. China’s
government sector used to control the entire economy before 1978 economic reform.
After 1978, size of government sector decreased dramatically to make room for the
private sector. Hence, the resurgent of government sector share shows that a turning point
had been reached in the 1990s.
Second, property income of the government sector is negative. This is due to the
fact that SOEs ceased paying dividend to the treasury in 1993 as many of the SOEs were
undergoing dramatic restructuring, often incurring heavy losses. In recent years, dividend
payments for some profitable SOEs have been resumed, but the percentage is kept low.
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For instance, some selected SOEs paid 5% of their profits to the Chinese government,
and the rate of dividend payment is gradually increased to 10% or 15% depending on
different industries in 2009. The rate of dividend payment is expected to increase to a
much higher level in the years to come, hence presenting a large potential income
increase for the government.
Third, government saving has been substantial in the past, and a large part of the
saving is transferred to firms. This fact is clear if we jump ahead to Table 5, which shows
that transfer income of “non-financial firms” almost match transfer expenditure of the
government. Understandably much of the transfer was used to help the restructuring
efforts of the SOEs. However, as most SOEs have completed the restructuring process
and turn profitable again, such transfer expenditure from the government becomes
unnecessary. Indeed, transfer expenditure decreased sharply in the later part of 2000s. In
conclusion, income flow of the Chinese government is very robust, and there is likely to
be much spending power that is yet to be allocated.

Table 3: Moody’s Sovereign Ratings Handbook and author’s calculation

Besides income flow, cumulative asset position is another important factor to take
into account in order to project the future financing situation of the government sector.
Table 3 list a number of items regarding the government sector asset position. The first
two rows show that general government debt has been constantly lower than 20% of GDP.
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This is very low as compared to most other countries, whether developed or developing
ones. For the purpose of reference, public debt to GDP ratio is 225% for Japan, 78% for
Germany and 59% for the US in 2010 based on the World Factbook data from CIA.3
Moreover, most of China’s public debt is denominated in local currency. This is
seen from the third row, where ratio of foreign currency denominated debt decreased to
less than one percent in 2009 and is expected to remain so for some years. When public
debt is denominated in local currency, the government faces no liquidity constraint and
hence payment difficulty. This is why Japan could maintain a pubic debt more than 200%
of GDP for two decades while Latin American countries suffered debt crisis in the 1990s
with much lower debt to GDP ratios. As Latin American debt was mostly denominated in
the USD, when foreign exchange reserves ran low or fiscal situations turned bad,
international investors fled from Latin American debt, selling off their local currencies,
leading to depreciation against the USD and hence deteriorating debt position.
Going down the table, fourth row shows the amount of external debt, or debt held
by foreigners. As a national government has much more influence over their own
residents than over foreigners, a lower ratio of foreign holding indicates financial
soundness. At the same time, as government debt is considered the most secure and liquid
asset, domestic holding of government debt will enhance the robustness of the domestic
financial system. Comparing first and fourth row shows that China’s government is
shifting towards higher percentage of domestic holding.
Finally, the last two rows are the amount of interest paid on external debt and total
foreign exchange reserves. It is widely known that China has the largest foreign exchange
reserves in the world, and short term interest payment is obviously not a problem. In fact
3

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2186rank.html
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the total amount of China’s foreign exchange reserves is getting so large that many
negative impacts have surfaced. Difficulty to manage such a huge reserve is just one of
the examples.
In conclusion, China’s fiscal policy seems way too conservative given China’s
income flow and asset position. Strong financial position of the government sector is a
double edged sword. On the positive side, it means that the government has huge
potential to safe guard the economy from external shocks. This is well proven during the
2008-2009 global financial crisis. On the reverse side, if the government fails to take
adequate action, the government sector is sure to register surplus in the near future. This
will push the private sector into deficit. As Chinese household is also running a surplus,
which I will discuss later, the entire deficit pressure will fall on firms. This will lead to
dangerous outcome as the financing situation of firm sector deteriorates as a whole.
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Chapter 3
Current Account

China has been known as an exports-led growth country. In recent years, much
has been written about China’s rising current account surplus and the importance of its
exchange rate policy. In a much cited paper, Goldstein (2007) blames China for failing to
allow more rapid RMB appreciation, and justify the position using indicators that have
become all too familiar to us: sustained trade surplus; non-appreciating real effective
exchange rate (REER); lack of role for market forces; and continued government
intervention in the exchange market. The paper further blames China’s interest rate
policy to be the impediment to smooth banking sector reform, more balanced growth and
independent monetary policy while at the same time hurting China’s trading partners. On
the surface, we are easily swayed into taking a convenient position; and think that the
exchange rate policy is the panacea to all China’s internal and external problems. In
reality, superficial views as such are highly misleading. In order to get a better picture of
China’s external sector, the first step is to look behind the statistics.

3.1 Exchange Rate and Trade Surplus
I have reproduced China’s historical current account balance in Figure 6, which is
identical to the current account part of Figure 3 shown earlier.

By looking at the
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aggregate data, 2001 is the watershed marking apparent current account taking of. This is
easy to understand as 2001 is the year when China was officially admitted into the WTO.
Before 2001, both surpluses and deficits were registered, but after 2001, there were
straight surpluses in a row. Moreover, the magnitudes of surplus both in terms of absolute
value and as a share of GDP have shown notable increase. For instance, current account
surplus increased from 1.3% GDP in 2001 to the 2007 peak of 10.2%. This is considered
to be a high level whether historically or internationally.

Figure 5: China State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)

After a decade of rapid trade growth, China has now surpassed both the United
States and Germany to become the world’s largest exporter.4 Hence, it is understandable
that other countries are concerned about China’s growing current account surplus. Lately,
mounting pressure has been applied for China to revalue the RMB exchange rate, firstly
from the US and later from emerging economies like Brazil. While the hope is for quick
and large scale revaluing the RMB to restore international imbalance, the Chinese
4

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2078rank.html
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authority has categorically rejected such demand, and this is not without reason.
Although it is clear why exchange rate has an impact on current account balance, simply
assuming that revaluing the RMB will solve China’s trade imbalance is not possible. He
(2008) refutes the claim that RMB valuation has a large role to play in the building up of
current account surplus by presenting two major empirical evidences.
First, the merchandise trade and service trade components of the current account
have shown opposite trends with the former going into increasing surplus and the later
into increasing deficit. As changes in exchange rates should affect both merchandise and
service trade in a similar manner, the opposite trends demonstrate that RMB exchange
rate does not have a large impact in both components of the current account. It may be
argued that merchandise and service trades may be highly correlated in a negative way so
that increasing merchandise exports will require proportional increase in service imports,
leading to the observed trend. A closer look at service trade items shows that
transportation has been the largest contribution to service trade deficit, hence imparting
more plausibility to the counter argument. However, other items unrelated to
merchandise trade such as tourism and construction also failed to show clear positive
correlation with merchandise trade. Hence, it is at most ambiguous that interest rate
changes have influenced both the merchandize and the service trade in a similar manner
as it should have.
Second, He (2008) points out that rapid current account surplus increase did not
correspond to period of exchange rate depreciation and vice versa. Figure 7 shows the
effective RMB exchanged rate index compiled by the BIS. As we can observe from the
graph, rapid appreciation of RMB from 1994 to 1998 corresponded to rapid current
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account surplus buildup in the same period though the reverse is expected. Further more,
the exploding surpluses since 2001 onwards also seem to coincide with rather stable or
appreciating RMB exchange rate trend. Hence, it is unconvincing that undervalued RMB
value has a large impact in the mounting surpluses. Further econometric tests on data in
He (2008) confirm the result of weak or non-existing relation between RMB exchange
rate and China’s current account balance.

Figure 6: Bank of International Settlement (BIS)

3.2 Trade Structure
If exchange rate, or mere prices changes, is not the main driver of China’s
mounting current account surplus, we must look deeper for structural reasons. China’s
trade and custom statistics differentiate exports into general trade and processing trade. In
our impression, China is often mocked as a big workshop, where intermediate goods are
assembled together for exports. This view is reinforced by a cursory reading of the
statistics, which show that more than half of China’s total exports today still consist of
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processing trade. However, this classification is not a functional one, but rather for tax
purposes. A careful look shows that there are two subcategories within “processing” trade.
First, processing that is based on contractual agreements with foreign suppliers of inputs
and foreign buyers of final products; second processing using imported inputs. Under the
first category, firms do not pay import taxes or VAT, while under the second category
firms first pay the required taxes and then claim rebates later. It is the first category that
conforms to conventional view of processing trade, where the exports are inextricably
linked to imported inputs. In the second category, the share of imported inputs can vary
arbitrarily, depending on the extents of domestic sourcing.

Figure 7: Haver Analytics and author calculation. Asia includes Japan Korea Taiwan and ASEAN

Over the years, China has steadily moved away from simple assembly line based
processing trade, adding both domestic content and sophistication. This subtle change is
reflected in China’s changing regional trade balances. Figure 8 shows China’s regional
trade deficits and surpluses. In the early 2000s, China’s deficits with Asia, and Africa and
Oceania largely mirror China’s surplus with the West, supporting the caricature that
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Chinese labor mixed intermediate inputs from Asia and raw materials from Africa and
Oceania to produce final goods sold to the US and Europe. However, this relationship
broke down after mid-2000s as China’s regional surplus growth outpaced regional deficit
growth. The clearest evidence came during the financial crisis when imports totally
collapsed while exports lingered on. The implication is that China was able to
manufacture most of the exports domestically.
As the exporting department is has evolved over time, we cannot simply use the
raw data distinction between general and processing trade as proxy for “domestic
content” of China’s exports. How dependent Chin really is on exports is an important
question for policy choices in dealing with trade unbalance. If reality is what popular
headlines put it at 60%, then China should by all means attempt to maintain its edge on
trade even at the cost of structural distortion in the short and medium run Otherwise,
China may afford to have much more freedom in executing its policies and prioritize
other more important factors.
The standard vertical specialization model developed by Hummels, Ishii and Yi
(2002) can be used to compute domestic and foreign contents in a country’s exports when
the country does not engage in any processing trade, and hence deduct “foreign
component” from the final exports value. The model is unsuitable for countries engaged
in extensive processing trade like China because it assumes that the intensity in the use of
imported inputs is the same between production for exports and production for domestic
sales. If applied directly, the result is likely to significantly underestimate the share of
foreign value added in China’s exports.
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Improving on the standard vertical specialization model, Koopman, Wang and
Wei (KWW 2008) draw on input-output (I/O) literature and create a generalized version
of the vertical specialization model. The new model requires both the I/O data, which is
used to determine sector-level total imports/exports, and trade statistics to determine the
relative proportion of processing and normal exports within a sector. As pointed out
earlier that the China Customs distinction between procession and normal exports is for
tax purposes, KWW (2008) only use the raw data as an initial “guess value”, on which a
further optimization based on ten constrains is performed. Using the modified model, and
feeding on 1997, 2002 and 2006 published China benchmark I/O tables as well as trade
statistics, KWW (2008) estimate domestic component for all China’s merchandise
exports to be 52.3%, 53.9% and 50.7% for the three data years. The estimates for
manufacturing goods are slightly lower at 47.6%, 51.3% and 49.4% in 1997, 2002 and
2006 respectively. Since no clear trend is observable and the results are considerably
close, it is convenience to use a generalized rule of 50% domestic value added for all
China’s exports.
Based on this rule of thumb, China’s is 15% dependent on export as we have
already discussed in the first chapter. Comparing to Japan in the 1960s and early 1970s,
which is the period when Japan’s growth was most rapid, exports of goods and services
only accounted for about 10% of GDP based on World Bank data, and this figure has not
undergone the same exercise of removing “foreign content” like we just did for China.
This comparison shows that Japan’s growth was much less dependent on exports. Other
well-known exports led economies like Korea and Singapore may have experienced
similar levels of exports dependency to those of China’s today, but these economies are
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notably smaller as shares of the world economy than China. The size of an economy and
the sustainability of its dependence on exports are closely related because a larger player
will alter the world market prices more severely.

3.3 Estimating Trade Elasticity
Given external demand still carries considerable weight in China’s economy
though not as high as people normally think, we still need to compute the exports and
imports elasticity in order to carry out projection exercises. Though some studies have
been done to estimate China’s exports and imports elasticity, most of them lack a
systematic analysis over a time span in recognition that trade elasticity values were
unstable in China. In this regard, I refer to Aziz and Li (2007), which make use of both
aggregate and disaggregated data and calculate the dynamic change of China’s trade
elasticity values during the period of 1995 to 2006.
Aziz and Li use the standard reduced form partial equilibrium trade model as the
basic analytical framework, where exports and imports are related to real foreign and
domestic demand respectively as well as relative prices. The authors added a productivity
variable to the exports equation to take into account of rapid productivity gain in China
because productivity improvement is responsible for much of China’s gains in world’s
export share. In terms of data, foreign demand is based on IMF’s Global Economic
Environment Indicator for China’s trading partners; domestic demand is approximated by
industrial sales; relative export prices come from CPI based real effective exchange rate
(REER) as most of China’s exports are final goods; relative import prices are aggregated
from trade weighted ratios of China’s PPI to external prices indices because China’s
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imports consist of mainly intermediate goods. Finally, the ratio of per capita GDP in
China to that in the US is used as a proxy for productivity control variable because there
are no reliable employment data in China for compiling labor productivity. Both exports
and imports volumes are quoted as USD amount. Quarterly data from 1995 to 2006 is
used because of exchange rate system reform took place in 1994 in China, unifying
official and market exchange rates.
Using Dynamic OLS method since almost all the series are non-stationary, the
trade equations are estimated for the entire sample as well as six rolling subsamples of
eight years each, the first sample spans 1995Q1-2002Q4, and the last sample covers
1999Q1-2006Q4. For the full sample, export elasticity to foreign demand is 3.77 and to
relative price is -1.55 while import elasticity to domestic demand is 1.12 and to relative
price is -0.92. Productivity coefficient is 1.30. As expected, results from the rolling
subsamples regression show significant changes over time. Generally speaking, demand
elasticity has been more stable than relative price elasticity, and import elasticity is more
stable than export elasticity.
In more details, exports demand elasticity started at 3.56, fluctuated in the mid
1990s and rose up towards late 1990s and early 2000s. Exports demand elasticity for the
last rolling sample is 4.26. On the other hand, exports price elasticity began at -1.31,
declined to almost -3.0 before turning back to -2.00 for the last sample. The fact that
China’s exports have become more sensitive to both price and demand is largely
explained by changes in composition of China’s trade, particularly the increasing
sophistication of exports and the rising domestic content of processing trade. For instance,
the share of exports that are less price sensitive, such as primary products, declined from
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14.4n 1995 to 5.3% 2009. In the meanwhile, those that are typically more sensitive to
prices, such as machinery, rose from 21.1% to 49.1% during the same period. More
details about trade composition can be found from Appendix 2. Besides, continued
market reform also increase responsiveness of exporters to market signals.
For imports, demand elasticity stayed put in early periods at around 1.10, but
increased slightly to 1.17 in the later sample periods. Import price elasticity showed more
variation, declining from 1.03 in the first rolling period to 0.41 in the last rolling period,
meaning imports have become less elastic towards price changes. An explanation for the
observation is that increased domestic sourcing of inputs has left the most price inelastic
products for imports. Evidence can again be found in China’s trade composition. The
proportion of primary products, especially raw materials and mineral fuels, increased
from more than 10% in the last twenty years. Primary products are typically more price
inelastic than manufactured products.
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Chapter 4
Private Sector - Firms

Having dealt with the public and the external sector, I shall turn to the private
sector in this chapter. While international reporting standards exist to guide the reporting
of the current account; and government budget is a clear concept; the private sector is
always the place where complication arises. This is made worse in the case of China as
the economy is undergoing rapid transformation. Broadly speaking, the private sector
consists of firms and households. Firms invest to make profits and households earn
incomes to improve standards of living. As behaviors of these two fractions are governed
by very different rules, firms and households are usually treated separately. In this
chapter, I will focus on firms first.

Table 4: China SYB (numbers are quoted as percent of total fixed investment)
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Firms are the main vehicles for investment, and investment is the backbone of
China’s economic miracle. As we have discussed in the opening chapter, it is more
appropriate to term China as an investment driven economy instead of an export driven
one. It may be argument that most of the investment might have gone to the exporting
department, so exports was still indirectly the ultimate driver of China’s growth. This
argument may be refuted by looking at the breakdown of total fixed investment. In Table
4, fixed investment is broken down by uses and by industry. Based on convention,
agriculture and manufacturing combine to form tradable sector; and construction and
services combine to form non-tradable sector. As manufacturing and construction
together form the secondary industry, non-tradable sector apparently receive a larger
share of fixed investment. Same reason is derived from the uses items as construction
makes up almost two-third of fixed investment.

Figure 8: China SYB, Fixed Investment by Sector 2009

There is a potential problem in the definition of the term “construction” because if
conventional definition is used, there is no way that the share of construction is more than
35

36

the entire secondary industry. Hence, I have also added a more detailed investment by
sector graph. Figure 8 provides a snapshot of China’s fixed investment in 2009 breaking
into sectors. It is clear that the only major sector which can potentially go into the
exporting department is manufacturing. Although manufacturing makes 30% of total
fixed investment, it is not possible that all investment in manufacturing is used for
exports. Hence, export intention may explain at most 10 to 20% of China’s fixed
investment. As a result, investment directed towards infrastructure accumulation and
domestic services are the most important intention for China’s huge investment, which in
2009 contributed to almost 50% of GDP as explained in chapter one.
If China’s investment is mainly directed towards domestic uses, it is doubtful
whether domestic demand can absorb the humongous volume of investment. Such
concerns are not unfounded considering the massive size of non-performing loans (NPLs)
among all four of China’s state owned banks during the 1990s. The problem was only
solved after multiple bailouts by the Chinese government. Today, Chinese banks
generally look healthy based on standard financial indicators such as capital adequacy
ratio, and probably more so than their counterparts in the developed world since the
Chinese banks were largely insulated from the global financial crisis. Nonetheless, the
highly monopolized banking sector means that the risk of investment will concentrate in
the large state banks, making them susceptible to overinvestment.
It is my goal in this chapter to understand China’s investments, whether there is
overinvestment, and if there is, what is a more sustainable level? Again starting with the
macro picture, a first step is to know the composition of China’s corporate landscape,
which is well indicated by the share of fixed investment undertaken by each type of firms.
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Due to China’s special background as a command economy, state owned firms, or more
commonly known as SOEs, used to account for the entire economy. Hence, SOEs
occupied the lion’s share of fixed investment in the early years of reform. Although the
share of SOEs declined steadily as China’s economic reform progressed, there is still
significant presence of SOE. As seen from Figure 9, SOE was responsible for more than
30% of all fixed investment, and the weight seems to have stabilized at this level as the
decreasing trend had disappeared in the last four to five years. On the other hand, the
share of privately owned firms maintained a straight increase with few exceptions. The
only notable exception is the three years following 1989, when political turmoil
threatened to change the direction of China’s economic reform. In 2009, investment by
private firms accounted for almost two-third of the total fixed investment.

Figure 9: Haver Analytics

The third type of firms is collectively owned firms. This is a special product of
China’s economic transition, and refers specifically to enterprises owned by towns or
villages. Due to political uncertainty in the early years of reform, private properties were
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constantly subjected to the danger of a sudden seizure. Hence collective ownership was
an expedient means of protecting property rights though management right were usually
controlled by few individuals. Furthermore, as most entrepreneurs lacked the initial
capital and borrowing capability, collective ownership was an important solution to
funding problems. The close interpersonal relationships within a village or small town
facilitated the formation of collective ownership. As a result of these advantages,
collective ownership was gaining much popularity in the 1980s and 1990s, and this type
of firms accounted for a peak of more than 17% of total fixed investment in 1993.
However, as private property right was enhanced further and further, collective
ownership became an encumbrance rather than an advantage. In fact, many well-known
and profitable collective owned firms were demised due to property rights disputes, and
many others were privatized through a number of means such as management buyout.
Hence, we see the share of fixed investment by collectively owned firms decreasing
sharply in the 2000s to less than 4% in 2009. Looking into the future, this kind of
informal collective ownership will only become more desolate, and is likely to disappear
soon. Hence, I will not devote further attention to the discussion of collectively owned
firms.

4.1 SOE Investment
By convention, SOEs should be attributed to the public sector rather than the
private sector, but doing so is inappropriate in China because ownership is not always
clear. For instance, many SOEs are publicly traded companies, meaning ownership is
mixed at least in theory. In most of the cases, the SOEs also do not receive direct
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financing from the treasury and are yet to contribute significant profit to government
budgets. Instead they tap into both the equity markets and the commercial banking
system for financing, and enjoy considerable sovereignty in executing their cash flows.
More importantly, years of reform have removed much social burden from the SOEs, and
today’s SOEs in China are ever more profit driven. Since they act similarly to other
private firms, the best option is to treat the SOEs as part of the private sector.
As a distinguishing feather of the Chinese economy, SOEs have received both
praises and criticisms. Letting aside of praises, criticisms are mostly concentrated on the
issue of efficiency. Many studies have been directed at the link between government
ownership and low efficiency. For instance, Sun and Tong (2003) find that share issuing
privatization is effective in improving SOEs’ earnings ability, real sales, and workers’
productivity. Using empirical evidence of public listed companies, Xu and Wang (1997)
show that there is a positive and significant correlation between ownership concentration
and profitability. More specifically, firms’ profitability and labor productivity are
positively correlated with the fraction of legal person shares but are either negatively
correlated or uncorrelated with the fraction of state shares and tradable A-shares held
mostly by individuals.
Although evidence seems overwhelming, these studies have one shortfall in
common: they do not provide a mechanism of how government ownership affects
corporate behaviors, and how these behaviors are transformed into lower efficiency, thus
leaving behind a black box unexplained. Further researches identify employment policy,
financing choices and investment behaviors to be the link between ownership and
efficiency. Among the identified factors, investment behavior is the most promising one
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because in order to maintain desired GDP growth rate, governments tend to push up
investments when other components are lagging behind expectation, thus leading to
overinvestment. Zhou and others (2005) provide a key evidence for this story by
empirically proving that promotion outcomes of provincial governors are closely related
to relative GDP growth rates of the region. Using a sample of 1286 observations
spanning from 1979 and 2002, the authors build a probit model that regress year end
outcomes onto relative GDP growth. The outcomes can be promotion, staying or
changing to equivalent posts, and termination. Relative GDP growth takes into
consideration of absolute growth rates, previous growth rates under former governors,
growth rates in surrounding regions, average growth rates under current governor, and
changes in growth rates. Three dummy variables are added to control for age, education
and political background. The regression results show that every standard difference
move in terms of relative GDP will increase chance of promotion by 15.2% and decrease
chance of termination by 12.5%.
Results from Zhou and others (2005) prove that there is strong incentive for
governors to push for higher SOE investment, especially at provincial levels and during
bad years. However, this result only reaffirm a suspicion that people have long held, but
contribute little to understanding the actual level of investment. For instance, in order to
conclude that there is overinvestment, one must be able to point out what is the
appropriate level of investment. Some attempts have been made. In one of the much cited
papers, Wang (2005) constructed theoretical models for both SOE investment and private
firm investment. Different ownership structures cause the two kinds of firms to have
different objectives and different financing options. For SOEs, the objective is to
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maximize both profits and production while private firms only have profit maximizing
goal. Both types of firms are subjected to financing constraints, but SOEs face lower
financing costs than private firms. Solution to the constrained maximization problem
show that SOEs will over-invest while private firms will under-invest.
While much can be said about the underlying equilibrium model itself, the
conclusions from such theoretical studies are of little use practically because many
variables cannot be quantified, including influence of ownership structure and level of
financing constraint. Other theoretical models are more readily applicable for practical
purposes, including the familiar Solow growth model. In Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005),
the authors carry out a simple exercise of calculating Solow’s “golden rule” saving rate
(which is equal to investment rate), and get an estimation of about 40%. However, an
economy needs to be in a steady state for Solow’s optimal saving and hence investment
rate to work. As China is apparently far from a steady state, and also due to oversimplification involved, this value is at best a rough guess.
A closest study to practical use is Tang, Ma and Zhou (TMZ 2010). The paper
uses differentiate the companies into national SOEs, regional SOEs and private firms.
The purpose is that the three types of firms have different investment mechanism. While
private firms are assumed to be purely profit driven, regional SOEs are subjected to
influences of the regional government, which as discussed before, have much pressure to
maintain certain GDP growth rates. To the contrary, national SOEs are directly managed
by the central government, and thus are more immune from regional governments. As the
central governors are not usually judged upon GDP performance but are more concerned
with a variety of measurements such as price stability, the incentive to push for
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investment pulled GDP growth is not as strong. Nonetheless, as China’s economic and
social stability is very much reliant on high GDP growth due to the constant pressure to
create employment, the intention to overinvest is still present. Based on such reasoning,
regional SOEs tend to overinvest the most, national SOEs next while private firms will
either under-invest or not overinvest.
TMZ 2010 uses two different methods to estimate the appropriate level of
investment, namely Tobin’s “Q” value and Sales Accelerator Model. The first method
reflects investment level based on equity market expectation and the second method
focuses on estimating growth opportunities based on growth rates of sales volume. The
residue of actual investment less “appropriate” investment will indicate over or underinvestment. A few control variables are added, including leverage ratio, cash ratio,
investment return from previous year, and age and size of the company. Two more
dummy variables are added to account for the macro economic condition and the
industrial wide environment during the year.
The data set consists of publicly listed companies from 2000-2006. Eliminating
financial firms, multinationals (companies that issued H and B shares), companies that
went through ownership restructure during the sample period and those with incomplete
information, there are 4397 observations for regional SOEs, 490 for national SOEs and
1331 for private firms. The regression results show that firms that engaged in
overinvestment include 1645 observations for regional SOEs, 97 for national SOEs and
578 for private firms. The percentages of overinvestment for the three types of firms are
56.1%, 25.3% and 18.3% respectively.
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The result for private firms may be rather surprising because most literatures
indicate that private firms are financing starved in China, and hence they should be
under-investing. The disparity may be explained by the fact that all private firms
considered in the study are public companies. Thus, they represent the group of private
firms that are most accessible to the financial market, and likely the banking system.
However, this group is by no means representative of all private firms in China.

4.2 Private Investment

Figure 10: Haver Analytics

Although private investments include both domestic investment and foreign direct
investment (FDI), FDI has attracted way more attention than its proportional share. These
reports or researches often point to the rocketing amount of FDI inflow into China in
terms of absolute value. True enough, FDI shot up from almost nothing in the 1980s and
early 1990s to a respectable amount that accounted for about one-third of gross FDI
inflows to all emerging markets. This is shown in Figure 10 where the momentum of

43

44

increase was strong throughout the later 1990s and 2000s. The only notable slowdown is
the years following 1997 Asian financial crisis. As a result, China is often used as an
exemplar for attracting FDI and utilizing foreign capital to realize growth. Tseng and
Zebregs (2002) is one example of such analysis.

Figure 11: Haver Analytics

The influence of FDI on China’s growth is exaggerated in two ways. First, much
of China’s FDI is in fact the so-called “round-tripping fund” that originated in China,
invested in Hong Kong and reinvested back into China to take advantage of the
preferential tax treatment of foreign investment relative to domestic investment. Though
the exact amount of “round-tripping fund” is unavailable, the fact that around 50% of
China’s FDI inflow comes from Hong Kong is a telling evidence for the rampant
occurrence of “round-tripping” phenomenal. Unless preferential tax treatment is removed,
there is no way of knowing the true amount of FDI flow into China. Furthermore, even
ignoring the possibility of “round-tripping”, the overall impact of FDI in providing
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finance is limited. As seen from Figure 11, the weight of FDI to total funding source is
never much more than 10%, and decreased to less than 5% in recent years.
The limited impact of FDI on China’s growth should not be mistaken for the
absence of contribution. Doubtlessly China has benefited from the employment
opportunities, management expertise and technology transfer that are usually associated
with FDI. However, the bulk of China’s private investment comes from domestic private
firms, which often invest using self-raised funds. These funds include accumulated labor
income, retained profit or borrowing from families and friends. Over the years, the
importance of self-raised fund has grown from significant to dominant. For instance, selfraised fund accounted for around 75% of total fixed investment in the most recent five
years.
There are a few things we may say about such financing structure. First, the
overall financial system is robust. Investing using self-raised fund is also called internal
financing. As internal fund is less influenced by external environment such as interest
rate changes and the overall health of the macro economy, firms will be in good shape as
long as the investment projects they undertake are viable. In other words, healthy firms
will not go underwater due to financing problems. Second, system wide risk is limited
because the financial system is sheltered from risks firms are undertaking since the
amount external borrowing is limited. Third, the importance of state budgetary as a
source of financing has declined and stabilized. It is understandable that only SOEs may
tap into state budgets through capital transfer. In chapter two Table 2, we mentioned that
government transfer spending largely went to the firm sector. The decline and
stabilization of state budget financing shows the completion of both SOE and market
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reform. On the reverse side, although the financial system is robust, it also means that
China’s financial system is not facilitating as much financing activities as it should be.
Hence, capital is not efficiently allocated, and there is much room for financial
development.
Finally, looking at the fof table, we can see that firms are running large deficits in
the form of net asset rundown. This is expected because firms borrow from households to
fund their investment. The other interesting point to note is that wage spending has
decreased while capital spending increased. This means that firms are in general
becoming more capital intensive.

Table 5: China SYB fof tables (numbers quoted as percentage of GDP)

Concluding the chapter, although there is overinvestment, the financial system is
in no immediate danger of systematic meltdown. However, more active financial reform
will have much potential in improving the overall efficiency of China’s economy, and
help firms to become more labor intensive as we will discuss in the next chapter.

46

47

Chapter 5
Private Sector - Household

Falling household expenditure as a share of GDP in China has raised extensive
media attention, and is the kernel of the whole rebalancing efforts in China. Referring to
Figure 2 shown in chapter one, China’s household consumption has remained at 35% to
36% for the most recent three years when data is available. This is extremely low when
compared globally. Based on World Bank data, the number for the US has remained
stable at 70% for the past five years, even during the height of financial crisis in 2008 and
2009 when credit crunch caused dramatic fall in consumer spending. The same figure
puts UK at 65%, Germany at 58%, and most other developed countries at 50% to 60%
range. For peers that are usually compared to China, Brazil residents spent about 60% of
GDP and India 57%. Household consumption for Russia dipped to 48% in 2008 from
over 50%, but quickly recovered to 54% in 2009. When comparing to other export-led
economies, Korea has about 55%, and Singapore is fluctuating around 42%.5 In fact, with
35% household consumption level, China is comparable to countries like Algeria and
Kuwait, which are oil dominated economies with GDP scales nothing close to China. It
should be noted that household consumption and private consumption may be used
interchangeably in the case of China although the private sector consists of both firms

5
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and households. This is because all firms’ expenditures are attributed to investment based
on available data. This statistical shortcoming may have caused China’s private
consumption to appear lower than the actual level. Nonetheless, the international
comparison done above and the historical comparison done in chapter one together still
provide substantial evidence for the low level of private consumption in China.
We have discussed briefly in chapter one why low consumption level is a problem.
This is because when consumption level is low, either net exports or investment has to
make up for the shortfall; otherwise the country’s GDP will contract. As China’s
economy is rapidly gaining weight, the world is no longer able to support a large enough
net imports from China to keep its economy growing at the similar rates the country has
enjoyed for decades. We have also discussed the downsides of supporting the economy
with excessive high level of investment. Before suitable strategies can be devised to boost
household consumption, we must understand the reasons that have caused its fall in the
first place.
Using empirical evidences, Guo and N’Diaye (2010) try to filter out the most
important determinants of China’s private consumption. By international experience, the
main factors influencing the level household consumption include per capital GDP,
household income, public consumption, real GDP growth rates, real interest rates, CPI
inflation, change in terms of trade, change in REER, the old-age dependency ratio, the
share of employment in the services sector, and a measure of financial development.
When per capita income in a country is low, most current income will be used for mere
subsistence, and there will be high consumption and low saving rate. As per capita GDP
rises, more income is available for saving. Hence saving rates tend to increase until it
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reaches a certain level of asset stock, which diminish the need for further saving. Hence,
consumption will rise again. As such, saving and consumption behavior follow a general
path at different stages of per capita GDP development, and thus per capital GDP can be
used as an important proxy to predict the level of saving in a country. While per capita
GDP tells a micro level story, the total amount of household income as a share of GDP
gives a macro level explanation of saving and consumption behaviors. As income
represents the constraint to the level of consumption, it is easy to understand why these
two are important determinants of private consumption. For the other factors listed above,
I will briefly explain each too.
Public consumption may affect household hold consumption in two ways. On one
hand, it substitutes private consumption. On the other hand, it frees up available resources
for household to spend. Depending on the magnitude of the two directional impacts, the
overall relation may either be positive of negative. Higher real GDP growth rates work
through higher expected future income and hence larger future wealth to increase
household consumption. Real interest rate increases discourage spending and vice versa.
CPI inflation has ambiguous effect on household consumption depending on inflation
expectation and whether inflation is temporary or permanent. If inflation expectation is
high, current consumption will be high. However, if inflation becomes runaway open
inflation, reverse Pigou effect will diminish household consumption. Better terms of trade
usually will increase consumption. REER appreciation increases the household
purchasing power and thus their spending decisions. Higher dependency ratio usually
increases household consumption as older people generally draw down their lifetime
savings. The share of employment in the service sector increases household consumption
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from both demand and supply side factors. On the demand side, as the service sector is
usually more labor intensive than manufacturing and agriculture, higher employment
share in services shift national income distribution towards labor, which is usually the
main source of income for household. On the supply side, as services are mostly nontradable, increase in service employment share itself means that a larger variety of
services is available for domestic consumption. Finally, Greater financial development
tends to increase household consumption as greater access to finance reduces the needs
for precautionary spending.
Returning to the Guo and N’Diaye (2010) paper, the study regress private
consumption data on the factors mentioned above using Generalized Methods of
Moments (GMM) estimator with an unbalanced panel of 39 economies. Natural log
expression is used for the equation to capture non-linear relationship between the
regressors and private consumption. The prediction result from the exercise fits actual
outcome reasonably well for the period from 1995 to 2007 although large discrepancy
exist for the prior data points. This is not a problem to be over concerned as the
discrepancy could be due to lower quality data in the earlier years. In order to check the
regression, Guo and N’Diaye add a China specific dummy and re-run the regression. The
result from the second exercise does not show improved result from the original one.
Hence, the study demonstrates that conventional factors discussed earlier explain China’s
declining household consumption reasonably well. Therefore, rather than searching for
alternative factors related to the Chinese culture, I will follow conventional approach by
looking at rising saving rates and falling income share for explanation of observed
decline in China’s household expenditure.
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5.1 Saving Rate
It has long been noted that China has extraordinarily high saving rates that dwarf
even all its thrifty Asian neighbors like Japan and Korea. The much quoted figure is the
gross saving rate, which has exceeded 50% in recent years as shown in Figure 8.
However, as all corporate earnings are assumed to be reinvested in China, the national
gross saving rate is arbitrarily overestimated. Hence the household saving rate taken
directly from China Statistical Yearbook 2010 fof data is more appropriate for our
discussion. The figure shows a continuous hike in saving rate since 2001 and it has
almost reached 40% in 2008. Though the exact number may differ slightly from source to
source, the overall trend and approximate level should be similar no matter where the
data come from.

Figure 12: World Bank Country Database, China SYB fof tables

The initial mild increase in the late 1980s and early 1990s is easy to understand as
Chinese households were moving away from subsistence income. However, the
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continued increase in saving rate in the 2000s is much more boggling both due to the
extent of the hike and the time period which corresponded to a time of rapid income
growth. The outcome is in direct conflict with life-cycle hypothesis (LCH) saving
literatures, which predict falling saving rate when people expect future income increase
and hence postpone savings. In Cao and Modigliani (2004), the authors try to defend
LCH by concluding demographic change as the major cause of saving rate increase in
China. This is because the one-child policy has undermined the traditional role of the
family in providing old-age support. Hence, implicit saving in the form of more children
is transformed into the explicit form of higher saving rate. However, the result from Cao
and Modigliani (2004) is unsatisfactory because the age-saving curve in China is not flat
but u-shaped, meaning that saving rate increase is most pronounced among younger and
older household heads. Thus, while saving increase by old people could have come from
insurance purpose, it is implausible that younger people are saving more to securing
retirement support. Hence, an acceptable explanation must account for both ends of the
age axis.
Chamon, Liu and Prasad (CLP 2010) provide such an explanation by attributing
the cause to income uncertainty and pension reform. Using China Health and Nutrition
Survey (CHNS) 6, and following Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008), which studies
the link between consumption and income inequality through the degree of consumption
insurance with respect to both temporary and permanent income shocks, CLP (2010) try
to differentiate the CHNS data into temporary and permanent income shocks. They find
that variance of permanent shock had remained stable while variance of temporary shock
had increased fourfold during the survey period. At the same time, CLP (2010) also
6

http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china
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analyze the 1997 pension reform in China, and conclude that the reform decreased
replacement ratio from 75-80% relative to the average wage to around 60%.
Using the empirical results, CLP (2010) calibrate a modified version of permanent
income model: the buffer-stock life cycle model. The method comes from Carroll (1997),
which postulates that buffer-stock savers have a target wealth-to-permanent-income ratio.
If wealth is below the target, the precautionary saving motive will dominate and the
consumer will save. If wealth is above the target, impatience will dominate and the
consumer will dis-save. In this model, increased uncertainty will require a larger bufferstock to handle and hence increase savings. Simulation results show that increased
uncertainty and pension reform can together explain half of the increase in saving rates,
or about 8%. The U-shaped age-saving curved is because higher uncertainty affects
younger household heads more than other age groups as buffer stocks are typically
accumulated at the beginning of life cycles. On the other hand, as older household heads
have less time to adjust to reduced pension before retirement, the pension reform has a
larger impact on them than the rest. As all parameter choices are relatively conservative,
simulation results could have been stronger.
Following this logic, further pension reform to recover or surpass the original
level of replacement ratio and at the same time providing more income certainty could
reduce 8% or more of China’s household saving rate. However, as China’s market reform
deepens, it is unlikely that people will enjoy the same kind of income certainty as they
did under SOEs, which used to employ for life and promote according to number of years
served.
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5.2 Household Income Share
If household income share have stayed the same, the increase in saving rate alone
would have only caused household expenditure to decrease to 40% instead 34% of GDP
in 2009 based on fof data. Hence, we have to look into household income distribution of
the other part of explanation for the dramatic fall in household expenditure. Although it is
widely felt that household income share in China has decreased in the most recent decade,
the exact extent of decrease is not immediately clear as different sources give different
results. He and Wang (2010) combine statistical data from various sources, and conclude
that the initial income distribution for household has decreased from the peak value of
67.2% in 1996 to 60% in 2007, when the data series ended. Correspondingly, initial
distributions for government and business have increased from 15.5% and 17.3% to
17.1% and 22.9% respectively during the same time period. More importantly, after
taking into account of tax and social welfare redistribution, the redistributed income share
for household has decreased from 1996 peak of 68.3% to 57.7% in 2007. Hence, the
redistribution process increased household income share by 1.1% in 1996 but decreased it
by 2.3% in 2007. This change reveals the underlying policy shift disfavoring the
household sector.
International and historical experiences show that national income distribution is
typically very stable both in the long run and short run. Hence, it is surprising that
household income share could decrease as much as more than 10% in a short ten years.
Bai and Qian (2009) point out that caution needs to be exercised when reading the
income distribution statistics and coming to the quick conclusion that intentional policy
changes are needed to reverse the drop. This is because part of the decrease is due to
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computational factors, and the rest is largely a predictable result of China’s economic
growth. The authors note that there were two major changes in recording methods in
2004. First, income of self-employed entrepreneurs was counted as wage income before
2004, but was attributed to profits thereafter. Second, all agricultural income was shifted
to wage income while the value was split between profits and wages prior to 2004. This
is due to practical difficulty of separating the two in the agricultural industry. Wage
income is the major channel of household income. Hence, any changes increasing wage
income share is likely to increase household income share while the reverse tend to
decrease it. As these two changes have opposing effects, the overall result is not strait
forward. Based on the authors’ calculation, the combined effect contributed to 6.3%
decrease in aggregate wage income.
Besides methodical confusion, China’s economic reform has shifted GDP
composition from agriculture to manufacturing, and state sector to private sector. It is
well documented that the manufacturing industry is more capital intensive than the
agricultural industry, thus wage share in manufacturing industry is naturally lower. It is
also noted that wage spending by state-owned firms is substantially higher than that of
private firms, partly due to larger redundancy state-owned firms tend to employ. As the
structural changes from agriculture to manufacturing and state sector to private sector are
the exact intensions of China’s economic reform, we should not be surprised that
household income share has decreased as a result. The authors again estimate that
industrial and sectoral changes have contributed to 3.36% and 2.12% decrease
respectively to wage share. Hence, if results from Bai and Qian (2009) are correct, 11.8%
wage decrease is caused by inevitable reasons. As wage income typically account for
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more than 80% of household income, these inevitable reasons have caused 9.4% decrease
in household income share decrease. Therefore, we are only searching for the remaining
2% of the cause for reasons that could have been avoided or can be reversed in the future.
Despite of the fact that decrease in private consumption may not be as dramatic as
it appears to be, and some of the causes may have been inevitable, it does not imply that
no action is needed. In fact, the sources for household income share decrease are present
across all major sub-categories, namely investment income, transferred income and labor
income. Based on China Statistical Yearbook fof data, the three major types of income
account for 6.1%, 10.9% and 82.5% of total household disposable income in 2008
respectively, with investment income making up the smallest share and labor income the
largest.
Within investment income, 84.4% is attributable to interest earning. Unfortunate,
legal constraints have instituted deposit rates ceiling and lending rates floor so that banks
can benefit from a comfortable interest margin. Porter and others (2009) show that
deposit rates would likely increase if financial liberalization is allowed to take place in
China. The paper models China’s banking sector as an oligopoly market where each bank
chooses lending and deposit taking activity and engage in Cournot competition. If banks
are allowed to compete for deposits by bidding up rates, small banks will offer higher
deposit rates to increase their size and larger banks shrink their deposit bases to reduce
costs as small and large banks are assumed to be on the downward sloping and upward
sloping portion of the long run average cost curve respectively. Using different
parameters and different methods of liberalization, the authors obtained the results of 36
to 61 basis points rate increase. Given current deposit rates ceiling is fluctuating around
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3% depending on monetary policies, the increase represents 10% to 20% in household
interest earning. Using income composition ratio quoted earlier, the change will lead to
about 0.5% to 1% increase in household income share.
Although the direct impact of interest rate liberalization on household income
seems small, there are a number of indirect ways where interest rate liberalization may
significantly impact household income and behaviors. For instance, buying a house is
usually treated as an alternative to depositing money in the bank. If increased deposit
rates direct funds away from the real estate market, there is going to be a large impact on
household saving and consumption behaviors. However, indirect impacts as such are too
complicated to model as there are many uncertainties involved. Hence, I will not take
them into consideration in the projection in the next chapter.
Other than interest earning, all other investment channels have minimal earning
capabilities. For example, dividends earning is very small due to three-tier reasons in
terms of capital markets underdevelopment. On the first layer, the IPO market is
immature. Hence, the per capita number of public companies is small. Secondly, as the
stock markets are badly monitored and the fund markets are underdeveloped, the
proportion of both direct and indirect share ownership is small. Lastly and most
importantly, dividend distribution is extremely rare in China for both SOEs and public
private companies. This is due to a combination of regulation deficiency and financial
constraints, leading companies to retain all profits since for reinvestment since alternative
financing options are very costly. As a result, increasing profits in the business sector is
not passed on to the household. Similarly, since SOEs hand little profits to their
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government owners, profits from SOEs do not benefit the population through the state
welfare system.
Turning to transferred income, we have mentioned earlier that the redistribution
process changed from favoring the household sector in 1996 to disfavoring it in 2007.
This is largely due to the SOEs pension reform carried out in 1997. The reform freed the
SOEs from pension obligations before a new pension system was established. It created
void in social safety net, which was only being gradually filled in the following years and
is still being completed in present days. Using the latest fof data, the household sector
received 6.2% of GDP for social welfare transfer in 2008 while contributing 5.7% GDP
in terms of income tax and social security payment. Thus, there was only a 0.5% GDP net
transfer from the social welfare system. Comparing to that of 1996, 5.0% was received as
government transfer and 2.7% was paid back into the social welfare system, representing
a 2.3% net transfer. Thus, there is a total decrease of nearly 2% GDP in transfer income.

5.3 Wage Income
Finally, I shall turn the focus to wage income. It is unsurprising that wage income
should make up the largest component of household income, but is surprising how
fragmented and distorted wage and employment data is in China. Most statistics
concerning wage and employment are collected and published under the central guidance
of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). However, other ministries have certain
statistical turf that is their particular responsibility for historical or bureaucratic reasons,
and there seems to be little coordination among the relevant ministries. For instance, with
regard to manufacturing employment statistics, the Ministry of Labor gathers data on
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most components of the city economies, leaving a small but rapidly growing segment to
the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, namely the “self-employed
entrepreneurs” who most often do not employ just themselves. On the other hand, the
collection of data and the reporting of statistics in rural areas and in towns are left to a
part of the Ministry of Agriculture. Given this practical difficulty in getting a single true
picture, I have to present both the official statistics and various studies to gain a better
understanding of China’s wage and employment situation.

Table 6: China SYB

Based on China Statistical Yearbook fof data, labor income has fallen from a
stable level of around 60% in the 1990s to 47.8% in 2008 as GDP share. This is due to
slow employment increase, which is around 1% and slower-than-GDP-growth wage
increase as shown in first and second column of Table 6. However, this situation does not
seem to fit the official employment data. In the third and forth column of Table 6, labor
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participation rate, which is the ratio between economically active population and total
population, increased slowly from 57% to 60% from 1992 to 1998; and unemployment
rate started very low at about 2% and increased slightly to about 4%. This implies a very
tight labor market where most people have already participated in the labor force and the
labor force is almost fully utilized. In an economy where the labor market is tight and
growth rate is high, it is implausible that wage rate or employment, or both of them
should not have grown more quickly.
The most obvious loophole seems to be the unbelievably low unemployment rate.
It is commonly known that China’s economic reform started with a situation where there
was massive amount of slack in the economy, meaning hidden unemployment or
underemployment was enormous. As laid off was legalized, we would expect
unemployment to shoot up, and this is generally what the media tells us that China
constantly face immense employment pressure. Although we may think there was
deliberate human manipulation of data, Lee and Jia (2010) explain that it is due to the
reporting guidelines that distortion occurred. The paper documents the major disparity
between Chinese and international unemployment reporting standards. In short, the
official figures only reflect unemployed urban residences who registered at local
employment service agencies. The term “urban” refer to cities that exclude employees
working outside narrowly defined city boundaries. Even population located in suburbs,
large industrial parks, and towns that have been officially established as urban places
since the 1980s are excluded from the so-called urban statistics on employment and
earnings. Hence, there is little surprise that the official figures do not reflect the overall
labor market condition.
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Due to unsatisfactory official figures, scholars and research agencies have looked
for alternative sources and come up with their own estimations. One of the major
alternative sources is the census data, which report 1% of total population and is
generally accepted as significantly more reliable, accurate, and thorough than other
annually reported statistics. Unfortunately, nation-wide census is only carried out once
every five years, and thus a continuous time series is not available. The most recent
census results are from 2000 and 2005. Although unemployment rate is not one of the
survey items, we may derive the implied unemployment by taking the ratio between total
employment and total economically active population. They are 10.4% and 7.4% for
2000 and 2005 respectively.7 Hence, 77 million and 58 million were unemployed in 2000
and 2005. The census results are similar to the sampling result carried out by the Central
Government Development and Research Center, which report that real unemployment
was between 13 to 15% in the 1990s, and remained above 10% in the early 2000s.8
There are other studies that have come to conclude even higher unemployment
rate than 10 to 15%. In a comprehensive report, Banister (2005) estimates that there are
100 to 150 million surplus labor that are either unemployed or underemployed in 2002,
which makes that year’s unemployment rate 13.3% to 19.9%. Banister’s result is widely
quoted in other reports. Besides, well known Chinese economist Feng Lanrui reaches a
total unemployment as high as 27.8% in 1998.9 Moreover, according to Yin Chengji, the
spokesman for the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, “Twenty-four
million people, including 6.3 million fresh college graduates and 6 million high school
graduates, will enter the job market this year (2010) but only 12 million jobs were
7

Based on calculation from Qin (2010), Inquiry into Economic Issues, issue 9
Ding, Ge, Dong, Yang and Sun (2001), Management World, issue 1, pp 6
9
Guo (2002), Teaching and Research, issue 2
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available.” However, NBS statistics only record an average annual entrance of 7 million
workers into the labor force in the 2000s. If we assume an annual entrance rate of around
20 million workers and keep the NBS total employment data, the implied office
unemployment rate will be 16% instead of 4%.
There are apparently many other estimation results. However, before
improvements are made on raw data collection, there is simply no singe figure, or even a
single range that can be proven to be the true unemployment rate. Nonetheless, we may
still draw some tentative conclusion from the various researches surveyed above. Firstly,
official unemployment figures of below 5% have underestimated the reality. Whether the
true picture is below 10%, lower tens, upper tens or above twenty percents, I am unable
to identify. Secondly, there is almost certainly surplus labor in China, and the number of
surplus labor seems to have decreased in the 2000s, especially in the recent years. Thirdly,
the difficulty of estimating unemployment is mainly due to the difficulty of identifying
total economically active population. Thus official employment data is more reliable than
official unemployment data. With these conclusions, we may go on to discuss other
literature regarding the relation between various policy options and the labor markets.
It is generally felt that wage rate is very low in China as compared internationally,
and wage rate increase has far lagged behind productivity increase. Based on the same
report of Banister (2005) quoted earlier, manufacturing wage rate in China in 2002 was
3% that of the US, 10% of Asian NIE (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan),
and 25% of Mexico. The most popular explanation is that large reserve of surplus labor in
the rural area has prevented wage rate from increasing. However, as reliable productivity
indices and wage rates are both missing, it is impossible to say much more about future
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wage rate path. The general expectation is that China’s wage rate will enter a path of
quicker increase because the pool of surplus labor has diminished. Waves of labor
disputes concerning wage rates were also observed in 2010, and in most cases resulted in
wage increases. This is a relatively new phenomenal. One of the reasons for successful
wage increase demand is that the Chinese government had stayed neutral in those
disputes while it used to side the employers before in an attempt to keep China’s wage
rate low and stay competitive in the export market. This further corroborates the
conjecture that pressure to create more employment has eased in recent years.

Figure 13: US Census Bureau International Data Base

More support for the story of quicker future wage increase may be found from
China’s demographic data. As effects of China’s world-renowned one-child policy start
to manifest on working population, the rate of new entrance to labor force will experience
a sharp decline. This may be seen from the population pyramid, which shows a large drop
in the 15 to 20 years old population cohort in 2015. By 2020, the first wave of baby
boomers will start to enter retirement age as shown by the group aged 50 to 55. 10 As
labor supply shrink, the pool of surplus labor may disappear sooner than we think. All in
all, the pressure will be on wage increases.
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Current legal retirement age for female is 55 years old in China
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If surplus labor have kept wage rate low, it is hard to see why employment growth
could not have been faster to prevent the decline in the wage share. There are various
reasons being put forward. The first line follows financing constraint. Fazzari and
Petersen (1993) argue that financially constrained firms would prefer to use working
capital as a source of financing to keep a stable level of fixed investment. This is mainly
due to high marginal cost of acquiring fixed capital, and at the same time an increase in
firms’ capital stock could serve as collaterals and thus alleviate some of the borrowing
constrains. On the other hand, working capital investment is easily reversible and less
costly to adjust. Using US data from 1970 to 1979, the authors provide empirical support
for fixed investment smoothing with working capital.
Applying the argument of financially constrained firms to the case of China, Aziz
and Cui (2007) explores the role of China’s underdeveloped financial sector in the story
of household income decline. Although liquidity is abundant in China, especially in the
last couple of years, only the large and cash-rich firms have easy access to bank credit,
which is the dominant form of financing in China, and most of such firms are SOEs. The
authors find that the persistent and rising difficulty for average firms to obtain financing
has played a major role in explaining the co-movements in employment, household
income and consumption. As economic wide data is absent, the study makes use of firmlevel evidence, which is based on the World Bank Enterprise Survey on Productivity and
Investment Climate (2002). The survey covers 1500 Chinese enterprises from five
cities. 11 Average employment growth was 5.36%. The regression results show that
without financial obstacle, employment growth could have been 2.45% faster for all firms
and 3.08% faster for private firms.
11
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Besides financial constraint, the other line of reasoning focuses on structural
problems. It is known that China has favored the trade sector by implementing
differential tax treatment, and arguably depressed exchange rates. Guo and N’Diaye
(2009) try to simulate the employment effect of China’s focus on trade. The paper defines
non-tradable sector to be the sum of the tertiary and construction industries and tradable
sector to be agriculture and manufacturing industries. Using the GMM with a sample of
28 economies12 for a total of 575 observations, the paper construct a cross country model
that link per capital income and share of employment in the services, agriculture, and
manufacturing while controlling for relative productivity of tradable and non-tradable
sectors, the real effective exchange rate (REER) and government spending.
Their regression results show that for manufacturing, China has a share of
employment consistent with its level of per capita income. However, the service sector
could potentially absorb 70 millions more workers, or 9% of total employment at its
current per capital income level. This has the implication of increasing wage income of
the 9% workers by 60%, or 5.4% increase in total wage bill. In order to do that, every
percent increase in service employment share needs 10% REER appreciation, 7%
increase in government consumption or 4% increase in relative productivity of nontradable sector.
To summarize this chapter, I have organized the flow of fund information for the
household sector as shown in Table 7. It can be seen that the household is running a large
surplus through asset accumulation, and at the same time shifting expenditure towards
investment. This means that households are building up potential to consume more in the
future if appropriate policies can be devised to modify household behaviors.
12
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Table 7: China SYB fof tables (numbers are quoted as percent of GDP)
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Chapter 6
Projections and Analysis

Having discussed all three sectors of the Chinese economy, I will go on to some
projections about China’s rebalancing efforts in this chapter. Instead of starting bottom
up, I will use a backward induction method. In other words, desired GDP growth rates are
firstly decided on. Then the entire GDP is divided into the four conventional fractions,
namely private consumption, public consumption, investment and net export. Following
the macroeconomic identity and using results from studies we have discussed, I will try
to figure out what actions have to be taken in order to realize the desired growth.

6.1 Scenarios
To do this, I refer to various sources of forecasts, including the IMF World
Economic Outlook forecasts, growth goals announced by the Chinese authority for the
twelfth Five Year Plan as well as other individual researches. Based on these forecasts, it
seems that people generally expect China to grow at a rate of 5% to 8% in the next five to
ten years, and the general consensus is that growth will gradually slow down. Hence, I
construct three growth paths: sustained growth, adjusted growth and slowed growth.
Under the sustained growth path, China’s economy will grow at 8% in 2011 and
gradually cool down in the next ten years to 5% in 2011, and thereafter maintain 5%
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growth rate until 2025. Under the slowed growth path, China’s economy will start with
6% real GDP growth rate in 2011 and cool down to 3% in 2021, after which 3% growth
rate will be maintained. The adjusted path is something in between where China will start
at 8% growth rate in 2011 and slow down all the way to 3% in 2025. The three paths
picked are supposed to be representative of some scenarios rather than predicting the
actual growth paths. They are arbitrarily chosen to determine the path of the three
balances and orders of magnitude.
Sustained growth
1) 20% appreciation REER

Adjusted growth
1) 10% appreciation REER

Slowed growth
1) 10% appreciation REER

2) tax equalizing for trade 2) tax equalizing for trade 2) tax equalizing for trade
and non-trade departments

and non-trade departments

and non-trade departments

3) financial liberalization

3) financial liberalization

3) no financial liberalization

4) 54% rise in government 4) 41% rise in government 4) 37% rise in government
spending and transfer

spending and transfer

spending and transfer

5) Implement over 10 years

5) Implement over 15 years

5) Implement over 10 years

Table 8: author’s calculation

For each growth path, I have prescribed a policy package, which includes
exchange rate policies, fiscal policies, industrial policies and financial liberalization. This
is shown in Table 8. The rationale for the sustained growth policy package is as follow.
Based on literatures surveyed earlier, a combination of 20% REER appreciation, tax
equalizing trade and non-trade departments,13 and 35% rise in public spending will

13

Works through increasing the relative productivity of non-tradable sector to tradable sector by encouraging capital
flow into non-tradable sector
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increase share of service employment by 9%, leading to 5.4% in wage income.14 Besides,
an additional 7% transfer in terms of pension payment will help to restore replacement
ratio to pre-1997 level. If income uncertainty can somehow be reduced, this will help to
reduce China’s household saving rate to 31.4%.15 Financial liberalization contribute to
household income in two ways, first by increasing interest earning, and second by
encouraging employment growth.16 Together it increases household income by 5%.
Further more, we have discussed that wage rate is likely to increase faster in coming
years. As no regression result is available, I simply assume that wage rate will contribute
1% boost to household income each year. Similar reasoning is used the other two policy
packages, which affect household income and saving to a different extent due to variation
of the prescription.
Regarding the external sector, exchange rate changes affect both imports and
exports. I take import price elasticity of 0.41 from the last rolling sample of Aziz and Cui
(2007), and export price elasticity of 1.55 from the whole sample. This is because the
trend for import price elasticity is unidirectional and seems to have stabilized in the later
period while the trend for export price elasticity fluctuates both up and down. For similar
reason, import demand elasticity of 1.17 and export demand elasticity of 4.26, both from
the last rolling sample are used. Assuming that the world economy grows at a constant
rate of 2.5% a year, 20% REER appreciation will lead to a 3.3% GDP trade deficit for
China while 10% REER appreciation will lead to a balanced trade.
For investment spending, we have discussed that overinvestment occur in China.
Total investment involves investment by governments, households and firms.
14

Guo and N’Diaye (2009)
CLP (2010)
16
Aziz and Cui (2007); Porter and others (2009)
15
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Government investment is part of the fiscal policy, so the problem of overinvestment is
not relevant. If we assume household invest rationally to maximize household utility,
there is little reason that overinvestment should occur. Hence, only firm’s investment is
subjected to overinvestment. According to TMZ (2010), regional SOEs, national SOEs
and public private firms are overinvesting 56.1%, 25.3% and 18.3% respectively. There
are two difficulties in applying this result. First, we have discussed earlier why the public
private firms are not representative of all private firms. Second, data for separating
regional and national SOEs’ investment is absent. As an expedient means, I will assume
that all SOEs are overinvesting 50% and no overinvestment occurs for private firms.
Based on fof data, firms’ investment accounted for 71.3% of China’s total investment
during 2000 to 2006.17 Referring to Figure 9 for share of private and SOE investment,
and referring to Figure 2 for investment’s weight in GDP, 5.8% of the 40.6% GDP was
overinvested. Hence, the appropriate level of investment is 34.8%, and I will round it off
to 35% for convenience sake.
Finally, besides those already explained, additional public expenditure is used to
boost GDP growth to the desired path. Take the example of sustained growth path, 35%
increase in public spending is needed to modify household income. Given household
expenditure after policy influence, a 3.3% GDP trade deficit caused by exchange rate
policy, and 35% GDP investment spending, there is still a gap between desired growth
and projected growth. Hence, I assume that additional public spending will make up the
residue so that desired growth equals projected growth. The policy package is
implemented over a period of ten years for the sustained and slowed growth paths, and
over fifteen years for the adjusted growth path.
17

In accordance with time span of the sample used in TMZ(2010)
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Projection for GDP breakdown is showed in Appendix 3. Based on the results,
private consumption as GDP share will increase from 35.1% currently to 47.9%, 46.4%
and 45.4% under sustained, adjusted and slowed growth respectively. As mentioned
earlier, net export will be balanced for adjusted and slowed growth, but register a 3.3%
deficit for sustained growth. As investment is set to 35% of GDP, public expenditure
makes up 20.4%, 18.6% and 19.6% of GDP for the three growth path respectively.

Figure 14: Author’s calculation

Besides GDP breakdown, we are also concerned with the three sector balances. In
chapter one, the private sector is shown as a derived value from the other two balances.
Through the discussion, we know that the private sector is made up of both firms and
households. In order to obtain an actual value for private sector balance, I take household
disposable income less expenditure to obtain household balance, and firm income less
wage payment and capital formation to obtain firm balance. In other words, both capital
formation and net asset change columns shown in Table 7 are counted towards private
sector balance while only net asset change column shown in Table 5 is included. The
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reason for including household capital formation in the private balance is because
investment as such is often a way to store surplus income. The best example is home
purchase. Based on China’s reporting standard, spending on rents is counted towards
expenditure while spending on buying a house is counted towards capital formation. Due
to financial repression, fund that could have been invested in liquid asset is usually
directed towards the real estate market in China. In this sense, capital formation by
household is optional, and often can be liquidated readily during time of need. Hence it
resembles a asset change. On the other hand, firms need to invest in both fixed and
working capitals in order to keep the operation running. For firms, investment is part of
the business instead of a surplus fund that is temporarily stored in the form of fixed
capital. Hence, it is not included in the sector balance. From Figure 14, we can see that
the actual data is far from a perfect match of the theoretical data. Years like 2005 and
2008 are especially problematic with gap of more than 3 or 4% of GDP. Nonetheless, it is
a reasonable fit that at least proves the legitimacy of the method I have calculated the
private sector balance.
Both household income and expenditure are implied from the policy prescriptions.
Firm spending on capital formation also comes directly from the sustainable level of
investment we have calculated. Assuming firm income will grow in line with GDP, we
can obtain the private sector balance. Regarding current account balance, I make a
simplification of equating it to trade balance. Although this is not exact, net exports
always account for the bulk of current account activities with orders of magnitude much
higher than that of net income from abroad and foreign transfer. Hence, this
simplification will not distort the projections results since we are not doing exact
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prediction. Applying the macroeconomic identity, we can obtain a public sector balance.
As public expenditure information also comes directly from the policy packages, we can
derive the public sector income. The projections show that public sector deficit will reach
5.7%, 4.4% and 3.5% of GDP for sustained, adjusted and slowed growth.
Correspondingly, private sector surplus will decrease from more than 8% in 2009 to 2.4%,
4.4% and 3.5% of GDP. Detailed results are included in Appendix 3.

6.2 Discussion and Limitations
The projection results show that China’s private sector balance will return to a
level that is similar to the period from 1996 to 2004. One of the worries for China’s
rebalance towards domestic consumption is inflation. Referring to the time between 1996
and 2004, when private consumption as cumulative share of GDP and private sector
surplus are both similar to projected magnitude, we do not see any sign of inflation.
Retail prices index were very stable; consumer price index actually experienced deflation
of up to 5% in 1996 before turning positive in 2000 and inflated at 1 to 2% rate; producer
price index went through even more pronounced deflation of more than 10% in 1996.
Regarding current account balance, external sector will resemble those of 1980s
and 1990s when both surplus and deficit could arise. If trade deficit indeed arises, China
will have a chance to reduce its huge foreign exchange reserve. In fact, trade deficit may
not be as far away as we may think. The latest news shows that China has already
registered a quarterly trade deficit of $1.02 billion in the first three months of 2011 as
compared with a surplus of $13.9 billion a year earlier. This is a sign that China’s
rebalancing is advancing rapidly as this project is being written.
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Finally, public sector balance projection represents uncharted water for China.
Although the Chinese government is unlikely to have any difficulty in paying for the
deficit as discussed before, the task of financing a larger deficit can be very interesting
for China. For instance, financing the deficit by issuing RMB denominated bonds in the
international market is a good way of promoting the use of the currency outside China. It
also provides an opportunity for China to find more varied ways of using its foreign
exchange reserve.
Through the discussion, it has become clear that the projection results presented
here is very much dependent on the results from the literatures I have borrowed. Even
though the literatures might be right when they were written, or are still valid now, there
is no guarantee that those relationships will be stable for the fifteen years of projection
period. In fact, in an economic environment that is changing as quickly as China, it is
more likely that the relationships I have built the projection on will change rather than not
change. Nevertheless, applying the macroeconomic identity on the Chinese economy has
provided us some insights on where China should go from now and what can be done.
Moreover, although the China miracle has been around for three decades now, it
is still a very short timeframe for academic advances. As results, much of the time series
data need to be improved, and much of the literatures I have dealt consist of working
papers. With more effort and better data, I am sure China’s experience will provide an
excellent case study for the advances of the subject.
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Appendix 1 – Macroeconomic identity derivation

Given identities:
Gross National income (Y) = GDP + net income from abroad (NY)
(1) Y = GDP + NY
GDP = private expenditure (PE) + government expenditure (GE) + net exports (NE)
(2) GDP = PE + GE + NE
Disposable income to private sector (YD) = Y – tax to government (T) + net transfer
from foreign sector (NT)
(3) YD = Y - T + NT
From (1) and (2):
(4) Y = PE + GE + NE + NY
From (3) and (4):
(5) YD = (PE + GE + NE + NY) – T + NT
Rearrange (5):
YD + T = PE + GE + (NE + NY + NT)
(YD - PE) + (T - GE) = (NE + NY + NT)
Private sector balance + Public balance = Current Account Balance
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Appendix 2 - Imports and exports by commodity

Source: China SYB 2010 (numbers are quoted as percent of total imports value)

Source: China SYB 2010 (numbers are quoted as percent of total exports value)
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Appendix 3 – Projection results
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